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Abstract
We investigate the problem of heterogeneous task assignment in crowdsourcing markets from the point
of view of the requester, who has a collection of tasks. Workers arrive online one by one, and each declare
a set of feasible tasks they can solve, and desired payment for each feasible task. The requester must
decide on the fly which task (if any) to assign to the worker, while assigning workers only to feasible
tasks. The goal is to maximize the number of assigned tasks with a fixed overall budget.
We provide an online algorithm for this problem and prove an upper bound on the competitive
ratio of this algorithm against an arbitrary (possibly worst-case) sequence of workers who want small
payments relative to the requester’s total budget. We further show an almost matching lower bound
on the competitive ratio of any algorithm in this setting. Finally, we propose a different algorithm that
achieves an improved competitive ratio in the random permutation model, where the order of arrival of
the workers is chosen uniformly at random. Apart from these strong theoretical guarantees, we carry out
experiments on simulated data which demonstrates the practical applicability of our algorithms.
1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing markets have seen a remarkable rise in recent years, as more and more markets use the
internet to connect people with tasks to solve, to people willing to solve tasks in exchange for payment.
While these tasks were originally simple tasks that could be accomplished while sitting at a computer—
say, labeling images or cleaning data—recent systems handle complex tasks in the real world. Services like
TaskRabbit let users hire workers to run errands, like picking up a package; ride-sharing applications like
Lyft or Uber provide drivers on-demand to transport customers; other services offer meal or grocery delivery,
house cleaning, and even on-demand massages1 to customers.
Accordingly, an important challenge for task requesters in crowdsourcing (and more general) platforms is
handling more and more heterogenous workers and tasks. A worker may not be able to solve all the tasks—
say, they may only be able to translate certain languages, or they may only be able to handle time-sensitive
tasks on a deadline far into the future. Among the solvable tasks, a worker may want different payment for
different tasks; a short task can require a small payment, while a more complex task may warrant a higher
payment.
At the same time, requesters must cope with a highly dynamic flow of workers. Since it is common for
workers to work for several different platforms simultaneously, the pool of available workers is constantly
changing. The requester may not have the luxury of seeing all the workers, and then selecting the right
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workers. Instead, requesters may need to select workers in an online fashion, where workers arrive one by
one and must be hired (or not) as soon as they arrive.
We take aim at both of these challenges in crowdsourcing by considering the following task assignment
problem: if workers (i) have an arbitrary set of feasible tasks, (ii) demand heterogeneous payments by bidding
for feasible tasks, and (iii) arrive online, how can a requester assign workers to tasks in order to maximize
the number of completed tasks given a fixed overall budget?
Singer and Mittal [8] were the first to study a simpler version of this problem. In their setting, each worker
has a single bid for all the tasks; all the tasks are treated homogeneously, and workers are assumed to be able
to solve all the tasks (if they receive a payment which is at least equal to their bids). We generalize their
setting in two significant ways: First, we allow workers to specify only a subset of feasible tasks that they can
handle. Second, we work in a setting with heterogeneous tasks: workers can have different preferences over
tasks. As we will show, this heterogeneity significantly complicates the task assignment problem; algorithms
for the heterogeneous case may look nothing like their counterparts in the homogeneous case.
As a warm up, we start by providing two algorithms for the offline problem – where the requester knows
the sequence of workers and their bids up front: first, the optimal algorithm via min-cost flows, and second,
a fixed-threshold constant factor approximation algorithm inspired by the algorithm of Singer and Mittal
[8]. Then, we move to the online setting, where we draw on techniques from the online knapsack literature.
As is typical for online algorithms, we measure the performance of our algorithm via the competitive ratio,
i.e., the ratio of the number of tasks assigned by the best offline algorithm to the number of tasks assigned
by the online algorithm on the same problem. When the bids are bounded in [1, R], the bids of the workers
are small compared to the budget of the requester, and the order is worst-case, we give an algorithm that
achieves an O(R ln(R)) competitive ratio when R ≤ B.2 The central idea is to use a moving threshold, and
take all workers with bid below the threshold. As the budget is depleted, the threshold steadily decreases. Our
algorithm is inspired by Zhou, Chakrabarty, and Lukose [13], who give algorithms for the online knapsack
problem. We also show a lower bound: for any (possibly randomized) online algorithm, there exists an input
that forces a competitive ratio of at least Ω(ln(R)).
Then, we consider the random permutation setting where the bids are adversarial, but the order of workers
is chosen uniformly at random. Here, we measure the performance of an online algorithm by comparing the
number of tasks assigned averaged over all permutations to the number of tasks assigned by the offline
optimal.
2 Model
Let us begin by defining our modeling more formally. We will use j to index tasks and i to index workers
throughout. We model the problem from the perspective of a requester who has a collection of m tasks.
Each worker i picks a subset of tasks Ji ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, along with the numeric bid bij for each task j ∈ Ji.
Workers arrive online: the sequence of the workers and their bids are initially unknown to the requester but
once a worker arrives, her bids for all the tasks are revealed to the requester. We assume that each worker
can be assigned to at most one task; we can relax this assumption by having multiple copies of each worker.
We denote the total number of workers by n. As customary in the crowdsourcing setting we assume workers
are abundant, hence n is large.
We model the sequence of workers (their bids and their order of arrivals) in two different ways. First, we
consider the case that we have no assumptions on the sequence of workers. This worst case scenario has been
referred to as the adversarial setting in the literature. Second, we consider the random permutation model
in which we still make no assumptions on the bids of the workers but we assume the order of their arrival is
randomly permuted before being presented to the requester. We define these two settings in more detail in
the following sections.
The requester has a budget of B and has to decide on the fly which task to assign to the worker who
arrives; of course, a worker can only be assigned to a task he is willing to do. If task j is assigned to worker i,
2In particular, when R  B, which is arguably the case in most practical applications, our algorithm achieves an optimal
competitive ratio of O(ln(R)).
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then the requester pays worker i at least the price bij . The goal of the requester is to maximize the number
of tasks he assigns to the workers while spending at most a budget of B and satisfying all the constraints of
the workers (on the tasks they are willing to solve).
Similar to the online algorithms literature, we compare the performance of our online algorithms to the
performance of the best offline algorithm (denoted by OPT), which can see all the bids and the order of
arrival of workers before allocating tasks to workers. As is standard, we measure the performance via the
competitive ratio: the ratio of the number of tasks assigned in the offline optimal solution to the number of
tasks assigned by the online algorithm (so competitive ratio is at least 1, and smaller competitive ratio is
more desirable).
2.1 Related Work
Pricing and task assignments have been previously studied in the context of mechanism design for crowd-
sourcing markets. Singer and Mittal [8, 9] provide mechanisms for task assignment when tasks are homoge-
neous and the workers are arriving from a random permutation model. Our work in the random permutation
section generalizes their work to heterogeneous tasks. Ho and Vaughan [5] consider task assignment when
the tasks are heterogeneous. However, they assume the existence of limited task types and the focus of their
work is learning qualities of the workers from stochastic observations. Singla and Krause [11] design price
mechanism for crowdsourcing markets using tools from online learning. Goel, Nikzad, and Singla [4] consider
the heterogeneous task assignment in the offline setting and provide near optimal approximation algorithms.
However, they focus on the mechanism design aspect of the problem—how to pay workers so that they report
their bids truthfully. This line of budget feasible mechanism design is inspired by the work of Singer [10] and
has been followed up in Singer and Mittal [8, 9].3 Also these pricing mechanisms have close connections to
the stochastic online adwords problem [3] and the online primal-dual literature (see Buchbinder, Jain, and
Naor [1] and references within).
Our work is inspired by variants of the online knapsack problem. In the adversarial setting with homo-
geneous tasks, our problem is an instance of the online knapsack problem studied by Zhou, Chakrabarty,
and Lukose [13] (see references within for more information). However, it is not clear how to formulate our
problem as a knapsack problem when the tasks are heterogeneous.
Variants of generalized online matching and the adwords problem are also related to our problem (e.g .,
see Mehta et al. [6] and Mehta [7] for an excellent survey). The adwords problem can be described as follows.
There are some bidders and each bidder has a fixed budget. Queries arrive one at the time, bidders bid for
the queries and the algorithm has to decide what bidder to assign to the query. If the algorithm assigns a
bidder to a query, the bidder pays the amount that is equal to her bid. The goal is to maximize the revenue.
While one might attempt to formalize our task assignment problem as an instance of the online adwords
problem, it is not hard to see that our constraint on the total budget of the requester cannot be written as
an adwords type budget constraint for the bidders.
3 Adversarial Setting
When comparing an online algorithm with an offline algorithm, we first need to precisely specify the inputs
on which we make the comparison. Let us first consider the worst case for the requester: adversarial inputs.
In this setting, there is a fixed input and order, and we compare an online algorithm in this single input to
an offline algorithm on the same input via the competitive ratio. We are interested in bounding this ratio in
the worst case, i.e., the max over all inputs.
Of course, if we really do not make any assumption on the input, we cannot hope to compete with an
offline algorithm as the competitive ratio may be arbitrarily high (see, for instance, Zhou, Chakrabarty, and
Lukose [13, Section 1.2]).
3While we ignore the mechanism design aspect of the problem in our formulation, as we describe at the end of the Random
Permutation section, all our online algorithms (either with a slight modification or as they are) satisfy truthfulness and incentive
compatibility.
3
Consequently, we restrict the adversary’s power by making one main assumption on the relationship
between worker bids and the budget: the ratio of the largest bid to the smallest bid should be small compared
to the budget. More precisely, we can scale worker bids so that bij ∈ [1, R], and we write R = B. We will
frequently consider  to be small—this is appropriate for the crowdsourcing problems we have in mind,
where (i) the scale of the budget is much larger than the scale of payments to workers and (ii) the tasks
are not extremely difficult, so no worker charges an exorbitantly high price. We refer to this assumption as
large market assumption because when the bids are small compared to the budget, the requester can hire
a large number of workers before exhausting his budget. This is in line with the common assumption in
crowdsourcing that n is large.
Before diving into the technical details, let us consider which range of parameters and competitive ratios
is interesting. Since the bids are restricted in [1, R], achieving a competitive ratio of R is trivial. So, we will
be mainly interested in the following question: Can we design an algorithm that has a competitive ratio
much smaller than R for any sequence of workers?
The rest of this section is organized as follows. We first investigate the offline problem, describing how the
problem can be solved optimally. Then we propose a simpler algorithm for the offline setting; the performance
is a constant factor off from optimal, but the simpler algorithm will be useful in Section 4, when we will work
in the random permutation setting. We then move to the online setting, giving an algorithm with competitive
ratio of O(R ln(R)) for any sequence of workers. Finally, we give a lower bound showing that any algorithm
has competitive ratio of at least Ω(ln(R)) in the worst case.
3.1 The Offline Problem
Let us start by investigating the offline problem where the sequence of workers and their bids are known
up front. We first show how the offline optimal assignment can be computed. Then we propose a simpler
algorithm that approximates the offline optimal assignment by a factor of 4. We show later in the paper that
how this second algorithm, while suboptimal, can be converted to an online algorithm.
The offline problem is a well-known problem in the crowdsourcing literature [10] and can be solved by a
reduction to the min-cost flow problem defined as follows. Consider a graph with costs and capacities on the
edges and two nodes marked as source and target. Given this graph, for a demand value of flow, the goal of
the min-cost flow problem is to route this amount of flow from the source to the target while minimizing the
total flow cost over the edges, where the flow cost over an edge is equal to the amount of the flow passing
the edge multiply by the cost of the edge.
We now briefly describe an algorithm for solving the offline problem optimally which uses min-cost flow
algorithms as a subroutine. Note that this algorithm is generally known in the literature and we provide it
here for the sake of completeness. In our problem, we want to maximize the number of assigned tasks given
a fixed budget. In order to do so, we first construct the following instance of the min-cost flow problem. We
start with a bipartite graph with workers on one side and tasks on the other. We then draw an edge from a
worker to a task if the worker is willing to solve that task and let the cost of this edge to be equal to the bid
of the worker for the task. Additionally, we attach a source node pointing to all the workers and connect all
the tasks to an added target node. Finally, we set the capacity of all edges to be 1.
First notice that any feasible flow in this graph corresponds to an assignment of tasks and workers.
Moreover, for any integer F , the minimum cost of a flow with value F corresponds to the minimum budget
required for assigning F worker-task pairs.4 Consequently, we can search over all possible F ∈ [n], solve the
min-cost flow problem on the described graph and demand flow of F , and return the maximum value of F
where the minimum cost flow is at most the available budget.
While the above approach achieves the optimal solution, we will see in the random permutation section
that using a fixed threshold to decide which workers to hire can be very useful. Hence, we next provide a
simpler algorithm with this feature; while this simpler algorithm does not guarantee an optimal solution
anymore, we show in Theorem 1 that its solution is within a factor of at most 4 from OPT.
4Since the amount of flow routed from the source to the target and the capacity of the edges are integral, the min-cost flow
problem has an integral solution.
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The algorithm, which we refer to as Offline Approximation Algorithm (OA) (see Algorithm 2) is mainly
using the subroutine Fixed Threshold Policy (FTP). In this subroutine, given a threshold value p, the
algorithm goes over workers one by one and assigns a task to an unassigned worker if the bid of the worker
for that task is not bigger than p. In case there are more than one unassigned task that the worker bids p or
less for, the algorithm break ties arbitrarily. The FTP subroutine is described in Algorithm 1.5
Algorithm 1 FTP
Input: Threshold price p, budget B, worker bids {bij}, set of available tasks J .
While B > 0, on input worker i:
Let Ci := {j ∈ J | bij ≤ min(p,B)}.
If Ci 6= ∅:
Output: a(i) ∈ Ci.
Let B := B − bi,a(i).
Let J := J \ {a(i)}.
else:
Output: a(i) :=⊥.
OA then searches over all possible values of p to find the proper threshold. Although the search space
is continuous, it is sufficient for the algorithm to restrict its search to the bids of the workers. Hence, the
running time of OA is polynomial in m and n. We show that the number of assignments of the OA is least
a quarter of the OPT for any sequence of workers.
Algorithm 2 OA
Input: Worker bids {bij}, set of available tasks J , budget B.
Let Q := 0.
Foreach bij :
Let q := FTP(bij , B, {bi,j}, J).
If q > Q then: Update Q := q.
Output Q (number of assignments) and p∗ := B/Q (the threshold price).
Theorem 1. Let ALGOA(σ) and OPT(σ) denote the number of tasks assigned by the OA and the offline
optimal algorithm for a sequence of workers σ, respectively. Then for any σ, OPT(σ) ≤ 4 ·ALGOA(σ).
Before proving Theorem 1, we state the following useful lemma.
Lemma 1 (Singer and Mittal [9, Lemma 3.1]). Let a1, . . . ak be a sorted sequence of k positive numbers in
an increasing order such that Σki=1ai ≤ B. Then abk/2c · k/2 ≤ B.
The proof of Lemma 1 is the result of the following two simple observations: (i) the sum of the second
half of the numbers is at most B and (ii) each of the numbers in the second half is at least as big as the
median of the sequence.
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider all the (worker, task) pairs in the offline optimal where a pair simply denotes
that the task is assigned to the worker. Sort these pairs in an increasing order of the bids. Let p∗ denote the
median of the bids. By Lemma 1, we can assign half of these (worker, task) pairs, pay all the workers price
p∗ (clearly an upper bound on the bid of every considered worker) and be sure not to exceed the budget.
However, there are two problems: (i) we do not know which (worker, task) pairs are in the optimal solution
and hence, (ii) we do not know the value p∗.
5While we use FTP as an offline algorithm in this section, the sequential nature of the algorithm allows FTP to be used
when workers arrive online (one by one). We exploit this feature of FTP in Section 4.
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To deal with problem (i), suppose we somehow knew p∗. We can then assign a worker to any task where
the worker has a bid of at most p∗ and continue until (a) we exhaust the budget or (b) there are no more
workers or tasks left.
In case (a), the algorithm made at least B/p∗ assignments and by Lemma 1, we know this number is at
least OPT/2. For case (b), consider the bipartite graph between the tasks and the workers described earlier
for the min-cost flow problem construction and remove all the edges with cost bigger than p∗. Since p∗ is the
median of the bids in the optimal solution, we know that in this graph, there exists a matching M of size at
least OPT/2 between the workers and the tasks. On the other hand, since we know OA terminated in this
case because there are no tasks or workers left, we know that OA has arrived at a maximal matching. Finally,
since the size of any maximal matching is at least half of the size of the maximum matching, we know the
number of assignments of OA is at least a half of the number of assignments of M . So ALGOA(σ) ≥ OPT(σ)/4
if we knew p∗.
To deal with problem (ii) (not knowing p∗), we run the FTP for all the values that p∗ can take and
return the maximum number of assignments as our solution.6
A brief detour: the homogeneous case. As we discussed in the introduction, we make a strong dis-
tinction between the setting with heterogeneous tasks and the setting with homogeneous tasks. To highlight
this difference, we show that in the homogeneous case, the following simple algorithm computes the offline
optimal: sort all the workers by their bids and (if possible) assigns a task to the sorted workers until the
budget is exhausted or there are no more tasks or workers left.
It is easy to verify that this greedy construction indeed computes the best offline assignments when the
workers are homogeneous. However, this method will not result in the optimal offline assignment when the
tasks are heterogeneous. For example consider the following toy problem with two workers and two tasks
where each workers is willing to do both tasks. Let the bids of worker 1 and 2 to be (0.4, 0.5) and (0.45, 0.7)
for the two tasks, respectively. With a budget of 1, the optimal offline assignment is to assign task 1 to
worker 2 and task 2 to worker 1. However, the homogeneous greedy algorithm will assign task 1 to worker 1
and will not have enough budget left to assign a task to worker 2.
3.2 The Online Problem
Let’s now move to the online setting, where the workers arrive online and our algorithm must decide which
(if any) task to assign to a worker before seeing the remaining workers. We propose an online algorithm and
prove an upper bound on the competitive ratio of our algorithm which holds against any sequence of workers.
Our upper bound crucially depends on the large market assumption where we assume that the bids of the
workers are small compared to the budget. So throughout this section, we assume the bids are bounded in
[1, R] where R ≤ B for some small value of .
Our Online Heterogeneous Algorithm (OHA) is inspired by an algorithm from the online knapsack liter-
ature proposed by Zhou, Chakrabarty, and Lukose [13], with an analysis modified for our setting. The idea
is to use a potential function φ : [0, 1]→ [1, R] based on the fraction of budget spent so far as an input. The
φ function acts as a price threshold: the algorithm assigns a task to a worker only if the bid of the worker for
any of the remaining unassigned tasks is below the value of the potential function—intuitively, as the budget
shrinks, the algorithm becomes pickier about which workers to hire. Once a worker is selected, the algorithm
greedily assigns a task arbitrarily from the remaining set of tasks. See Algorithm 3 for a pseudo-code.7
Theorem 2. Let ALGOHA(σ) and OPT(σ) denote the number of tasks assigned by the OHA and the offline
optimal algorithm for a sequence of workers σ, respectively. Then for any σ with bids in [1, R] such that
R ≤ B, OPT(σ)/ALGOHA(σ) ≤ (R · e) (ln(R) + 3) .
6Note that this might result in OA using a threshold p which is different than p∗ but since OA picks a p that maximizes
the number of assignments we know the number of assignments made by OA using p is at least as large as the number of
assignments made by OA using p∗.
7In Algorithm 3, e is the base of natural logarithm.
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Algorithm 3 OHA
Input: Available tasks J , budget B.
Online input: Worker bids {bij} ∈ [1, R].
Define φ(x) = min((R · e)1−x, R).
Let x := 0, f := B.
While B > 0, on input i:
Let Ci := {j ∈ J | bij ≤ min(f, φ(x))}.
If Ci 6= ∅ then
Output a(i) ∈ Ci.
Let x := x+ bi,a(i)/B.
Let f := f − bi,a(i).
Let J := J \ {a(i)}.
else:
Output: a(i) :=⊥.
Proof. Fix a sequence of workers σ. Let S = {(i, j)} be the set of (worker, task) pairs assigned by the OHA
where i and j index workers and tasks, respectively. Also let S∗ = {(i∗, j∗)} be the offline optimal. We want
to bound OPT(σ)/ALGOHA(σ) = |S∗|/|S|.
Let xi and X denote the fraction of the budget used by the OHA when worker i arrives and upon
termination, respectively. We will analyze the (worker, task) pairs in three stages. First, consider the common
(worker, task) pairs which we denote by (i, j) ∈ S∩S∗. Let W = ∑(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij denote the total bid of such
workers. Since each worker i in the common part who is assigned to task j is picked by the OHA, it must
be that bij ≤ φ(xi). Therefore,
|S ∩ S∗| ≥
∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗
bij
φ(xi)
. (1)
Second, consider (i, j) ∈ S∗ \ S. This can happen either because (i) the worker i is assigned to a task
different than j by OHA, or (ii) the worker i is not assigned to any task by OHA. We know the number of
pairs that satisfy the condition (i) is at most |S| because all such workers are assigned to a task by both
OHA and the offline optimal.
For the pairs that satisfy condition (ii), either (a) bij ≤ φ(xi) or (b) bij > φ(xi). It is easy to see that in
case (a), OHA assigned task j to some other worker i′ who arrived before i. Again we know this can happen
at most |S| times. For case (b), since φ is non-increasing then bij > φ(xi) ≥ φ(X) for all such pairs (i, j).
Since the offline optimal spent a budget of W for hiring workers in S∗ ∩ S, then it has a budget of at most
B−W to hire workers in case (b). Since all the pairs in case (b) have bij > φ(xi) ≥ φ(X), the offline optimal
can hire at most (B −W )/bij ≤ (B −W )/φ(X) workers. Adding up cases (i) and (ii), we can bound
|S∗ \ S| ≤ 2|S|+ (B −W )
φ(X)
. (2)
Finally, consider (i, j) ∈ S \ S∗. Since bij ≤ φ(xi) for all such pairs, we know
|S \ S∗| ≥
∑
(i,j)∈S\S∗
bij
φ(xi)
. (3)
Putting all the pieces together, Equations (1) to (3) yield
OPT(σ)− 2 ·ALGOHA(σ)
ALGOHA(σ)
=
|S ∩ S∗|+ |S∗ \ S| − 2|S|
|S ∩ S∗|+ |S \ S∗| ≤
∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(xi) + |S∗ \ S| − 2|S|∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(xi) + |S \ S∗|
. (4)
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To see why the inequality holds, first note that we know |S ∩ S∗| ≥∑(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(xi) by Equation (1).
Now if OPT = |S∗| < 3|S| then we are done. Otherwise,
|S∗| ≥ 3|S| =⇒ |S ∩ S∗|+ |S∗ \ S| ≥ |S \ S∗|+ |S ∩ S∗|+ 2|S| =⇒ |S∗ \ S| − 2|S| ≥ |S \ S∗|.
Hence, the inequality holds because if a ≥ b and c ≥ d then (a+ c)/(a+ d) ≤ (b+ c)/(b+ d).
We bound the right hand side of Equation (4) as follows.∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(xi) + |S∗ \ S| − 2|S|∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(xi) + |S \ S∗|
≤
∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(xi) + 2|S|+ (B −W )/φ(X)− 2|S|∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(xi) + |S \ S∗|
=
∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(xi) + (B −W )/φ(X)∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(xi) + |S \ S∗|
≤
∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(X) + (B −W )/φ(X)∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(xi) + |S \ S∗|
=
W/φ(X) + (B −W )/φ(X)∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(xi) + |S \ S∗|
=
B/φ(X)∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(xi) + |S \ S∗|
≤ B/φ(X)∑
(i,j)∈S∩S∗ bij/φ(xi) +
∑
(i,j)∈S\S∗ bij/φ(xi)
=
B/φ(X)∑
(i,j)∈S bij/φ(xi)
=
1
φ(X)
∑
(i,j)∈S ∆(xi)/φ(xi)
,
where ∆(xi) := xi+1 − xi. The first inequality is due to Equation (2), the second is due to monotonicity
of φ and the third inequality is due to Equation (3). Since (i, j) ∈ S, OHA assigns task j to worker i and
increases the fraction of the budget consumed by bij/B, so bij/B = ∆(xi).
We now estimate the sum with an integral. If ∆(xi) ≤ ,∑
(i,j)∈S
∆(xi)
1
φ(xi)
≥
∫ X−
0
1
φ(xi)
dx.
Letting c = 1/(1 + ln(R)), we have φ(x) = R if x ≤ c. Similar to [13], we bound the integral as follows.∫ X−
0
1
φ(xi)
dx =
∫ c
0
1
R
dx+
∫ X−
c
1
φ(xi)
dx
=
c
R
+
1
Re
· 1
1 + ln(R)
((Re)X− − (Re)c)
=
(
c
R
− 1
Re
· 1
1 + ln(R)
(Re)c
)
+
1
Re
· 1
ln(R) + 1
(Re)X−
=
1
Re
· 1
1 + ln(R)
(Re)X−
=
1
φ(X)
· (Re)
−
1 + ln(R)
.
It is easy to show by algebraic manipulation that the first term in the 3rd line is equal to 0. Therefore,
OPT(σ)− 2 ·ALGOHA(σ)
ALGOHA(σ)
≤ 1
φ(X)
∑
(i,j)∈S ∆(xi)/φ(xi)
≤ (Re)(ln(R) + 1).
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Thus, OPT(σ) ≤ ((Re)(ln(R) + 3) ·ALGOHA(σ), as desired.
3.3 A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio
To wrap up this section, we show that if the large market assumption is the only assumption on the sequence
of workers, then no algorithm (even randomized) can achieve a constant competitive ratio. We prove the
result for the special case that all the tasks are homogeneous.
The proof is very similar to the lower bound for the competitive ratio in a variant of the online knapsack
problem studied by Zhou, Chakrabarty, and Lukose [13]. In this variant, items arrive one by one online and
we have a knapsack with some known capacity. Each item has a weight and a utility parameter and it is
assumed that the utility to weight ratio for all the items are within a bounded range. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the weight of each item is small compared to the capacity of the knapsack (similar to our large
market assumption). The algorithm have to decide whether to pick an item or not upon arrival and the goal
is to maximize the utility of the picked items while satisfying the knapsack capacity constraint. Since our
setting when the tasks are homogeneous is a special case of the online knapsack variant, the lower bound
for that problem might not necessarily provide us with a lower bound. However, we show that with a bit of
care, we can achieve the same lower bound using a similar construction.
The main idea of the lower bound is to construct hard sequences of worker arrivals. A hard sequence can be
described as follows. The sequence starts with workers with maximum bid, R, and then the following workers
progressively have smaller and smaller bids compared to the preceding workers. Then at some random point
until the end of the sequence only workers with bid R appear in the sequence. Intuitively, these sequences are
hard because no algorithm can foresee whether the bids will decrease (so it should wait for cheaper workers)
or increase (so it should spend its budget on the current workers).
Theorem 3. For any (possibly randomized) online algorithm, there exists a set of sequences of worker
arrivals satisfying the large market assumption (all bids in [1, R] and R B) such that the competitive ratio
of the algorithm on the sequence is at least Ω (ln(R)).
Since the proof is modification of a proof by Zhou, Chakrabarty, and Lukose [13], we defer the details to
Appendix A.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that if we consider the limit where worker’s bids are very small compared
to the budget ( → 0), Theorem 2 shows that Algorithm 3 has an optimal competitive ratio approaching
O(ln(R)), the best possible as proven by Theorem 3.
4 Random Permutation Setting
Now that we have considered the worst-case scenario of inputs, let us consider more “well-distributed” inputs.
We consider the random permutation model [3]. In the random permutation model there is no assumption
about the bids of the workers (they can still be chosen by an adversary) but we measure the competitive ratio
a bit differently: we take all possible permutations of these workers, and take the average competitive ratio
over all permutations. Intuitively, this assumption makes the task assignment easier because the premium
workers get distributed evenly in the sequence.
As pointed out by Devanur and Hayes [3], the random permutation model can be considered as drawing
bids from an unknown distribution without replacement. Hence, the random permutation model is very
similar to the model that assumes the bids of the workers are drawn i .i .d . from an unknown distribution.
Throughout this section, we assume that the number of available workers, n, is large and known to us.
Also, we restrict our attention to inputs where the offline optimal algorithm assigns at least a constant
fraction of workers, i.e., OPT(σ) = Ω(n) for all sequences σ.
For the case that the workers are homogeneous, Singer and Mittal [9] provide an algorithm with com-
petitive ratio of 360. In this section, we extend their result to the case the tasks are heterogeneous. We
also improve on their competitive ratio, though the setting is a bit different: as they were concerned with
mechanism design properties, it was important for Singer and Mittal [9] to carefully tune their payments to
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(i) incentivize workers to bid honestly and (ii) compensate all workers, even workers at the very beginning.
Our algorithm only satisfies the first property. We discuss more about this at the end of this section.
If we knew the sequence of the workers and their bids, we could run OA to compute a threshold price p and
number of assignments Q where we know Q is at least a quarter of the optimal number of assignments by The-
orem 1. However, since we are in the random permutation model, we can estimate this threshold with high
probability by observing a subset of workers. This idea is summarized as the Random Permutation Algorithm
(RPA) in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 RPA
Input: Parameter α ∈ (0, 1), set of available tasks J , budget B.
Online input: Worker bids {bij}.
Let C be the first half of workers; do not assign.
Let pˆ := OA(C, J,B/2).
On rest of input, run FTP((1 + α)pˆ, B/2).
The algorithm observes the first half of workers, assign no tasks but computes a threshold pˆ by running
OA with a half of the budget on the sequence of workers on the first half. Given an input parameter α, the
algorithm then uses the threshold (1+α)pˆ and runs FTP on the second half of the workers with the remaining
half of the budget.8 While using the threshold (1 + α)pˆ instead of pˆ might decrease the performance of our
algorithm, we show that (1 + α)pˆ is higher than p with high probability and use this observation to make
the analysis of the competitive ratio of RPA easier.
Theorem 4. Let α, δ ∈ (0, 1), and suppose the number of workers is at least
n = Ω
(
1
α
log(
1
δ
)
)
,
and OPT = Ω(n) for every input. For any sequence of workers σ, let ALGRPA(σ) and OPT(σ) denote
the number of tasks assigned by the RPA and the offline optimal algorithm for a sequence of workers σ,
respectively. Then,
OPT(σ) ≤ 8(1 + α)2/(1− α) ·ALGRPA(σ),
with probability at least 1− δ for all σ.
Proof. If we knew the sequence of the workers and their bids, we could run OA to compute a price p and
number of assignments Q. We know Q ≥ OPT/4 by Theorem 1. Let us refer to these Q workers hired by
OA as good workers.
We first claim that if we use a price of (1 + α) · p instead of p, the number of assignments will decrease
by a factor of (1 + α). This is because we can still assign a task to workers who OA assigned a task to with
a threshold of p, but now we also have access to workers with bids in (p, (1 + α) · p] which may cause us to
exhaust the budget faster.
Second, we can estimate p from the first half of the workers. Call this estimate pˆ. We claim that at least
(1− α)Q/2 of the good workers are in the second half of the sequence with high probability, and
p ≤ (1 + α)pˆ ≤ (1 + α)p/(1− α). (5)
This together with the first claim and the 4-approximation of OA will give us the competitive ratio claimed
in the statement of the theorem.
To complete the proof, we first show that there are enough good workers in the second half of the sequence.
Since we are in the random permutation model, then with high probability, we know the number of good
8While we can use the whole budget on the second half of the workers (as we did in our experiments) because the algorithm
assigns no tasks to the first half of the workers, this will only decrease the competitive ratio by a factor of half.
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workers in the first half of the workers is in [Q(1− α)/2, Q(1 + α)/2]. Chvatal [2] show that this probability
is bounded by
1− 2
Q∑
i=Q(1+α)/2
(
i
Q/2
)(
n/2−i
n−Q
)(
n
n/2
) = {1−O(e−αQ2/n) if Q ≥ n2 ,
1−O(e−α(n−Q)2Q/n2) if Q < n2
= 1−O(e−αn).
To prove that Equation (5) holds, we consider two cases.
1. The number of good workers in the first half is [Q(1 − α)/2, Q/2). In this case pˆ ≥ p because we can
obviously use the budget to assign tasks to all the good workers. And if there is leftover budget, we
might be able to assign tasks to workers with bid greater than p. So,
pˆ
Q
2
(1− α) ≤ B
2
=
pQ
2
=⇒ pˆ ≤ 1
(1− α)p,
since B = PQ by the last line in Algorithm 2. Combined with pˆ ≥ p, the condition in Equation (5)
holds in this case.
2. The number of good workers in the first half is [Q/2, Q(1 + α)/2].
In this case pˆ ≤ p. Suppose by contradiction that pˆ > p. This means the workers hired by the OA with
bids of at most pˆ is at least S = B/(2pˆ). We know S ≥ Q/2 because all good workers have bids of
most p. So,
B
2pˆ
=
pQ
2pˆ
≥ Q
2
=⇒ p ≥ pˆ,
which is a contradiction. Thus,
pˆ
Q
2
(1 + α) ≥ B
2
=
pQ
2
=⇒ pˆ ≥ 1
1 + α
p.
Combined with pˆ ≤ p, the condition in Equation (5) also holds in this case, concluding the proof.
A Note On Incentive Compatibility. A problem closely related to ours is to design incentive compatible
mechanisms in a setting where the workers arrive online but their bids are private and unknown to the
requester [9]. While our focus in this paper was mainly on designing competitive online algorithms, we point
out that both of our online algorithms, OHA (Algorithm 3) and RPA (Algorithm 4), can lead to incentive
compatible mechanisms in a straightforward way. We briefly describe this relation here and omit the formal
proofs.
For any worker i, let φi denote the largest price that satisfies the potential φ upon the arrival of worker i.
Suppose in OHA, instead of checking the bids of each worker against the potential function φ, the requester
simply offers φi to worker i (without knowing the worker’s true bids). One can simply check that by allocating
this budget to the i-th worker instead of her bid (which is never bigger than φi by definition) in OHA, the
proof of Theorem 2 still holds and consequently the modified OHA still achieves the promised competitive
ration. However, in this variant of OHA, the dominant strategy for a worker is to reveal her true bid since
her utility (i.e, the payment she receives) is independent of her true bid (0 if bij > φi and φi otherwise).
Similarly, we can argue this property for the RPA (with the modification that we pay the workers equal
to the fixed threshold price not their true bid) also. Although we are dealing with heterogeneous tasks, the
analysis of incentive compatibility is similar to Singer and Mittal [9] which only consider homogenous tasks.
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Figure 1: Competitive Ratio of OHA and RPA against an adversarially chosen input. The line with circle
shows the competitive ratio of OHA on the adversarial sequence. The lines with diamond and square show
the competitive ratio of RPA and OHA on the randomly permuted sequence, respectively. A line for ln(R)
as the theoretical bound on the competitive ratio of OHA is also provided. The plot is presented in log-scale.
5 Experiments
In this section we describe some experiments to examine the performance of OHA (Algorithm 3) and RPA
(Algorithm 4) on synthetic data.9
We conduct two sets of experiments. The first set focuses on the performance under homogeneous and
adversarially chosen bids (similar to the hard distribution in Theorem 3). In the second set of experiments,
we use a sequence of heterogeneous workers and bids produced from a family of distributions meant to model
input in practical settings.
Adversarial Homogenous Bids. The input in this setting is created similar to the hard distribution
in Theorem 3 with groups of workers that are willing to solve any of the tasks with the same bid, but the
bids may vary across different groups of workers. Since these instances are hard inputs from the adversarial
setting (as shown in Theorem 3), they are a good benchmark for comparing the algorithms in adversarial
setting.
Formally, the input is created as follows. We vary R in the range from 2 to 220 (on all powers of two) and
set B = 2R. The bids of the workers are R,R/2, . . . , R/2i, where in each experiment, i is chosen uniformly
at random from {1, 2, . . . , log2R}; for each group with bid R/2i, there will be B · 2i/R workers. We always
pad the input with a set of workers with bid R to ensure that the total number of workers in each instance is
the same (i.e., we set n = 8R). We set the number of tasks to be equal to the number of workers (so a worker
will never run out of tasks to solve no matter what the previous workers have done). Finally, for each value
of R, we create the input 10, 000 times and compute the average competitive ratio of OHA. Note that since
in this distribution, there is essentially no suitable worker in the second half, RPA performs very poorly and
hence we do not include it in this part of the experiment. We then ran the same experiment (for both OHA
and RPA) on the same input but this time we permute the workers randomly; Figure 1 shows the result for
this experiment.
The experiment over the truly adversarial input shows that OHA outperforms the theoretical guarantee
of O(R ln (R)), ( = 0.5 here) and grows roughly like lnR, suggesting that the true performance of OHA
may be closer to our theoretical lower bound from Theorem 3.
The experiment over the randomly permuted input shows that RPA is obtaining a constant competitive
ratio even though the input does not satisfy all the properties required by Theorem 4 (e.g., OPT = Ω(n)
9We slightly modified the RPA in our experiments by using all the budget (instead of half) on the second half of the workers.
Note that this modification can only improve the performance in our implementation compared to our theoretical guarantee
for Algorithm 4.
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Figure 2: Competitive Ratio of OHA and RPA against the uniform heterogeneous bids.
assumption). Interestingly, even OHA performs very well over the input (only slightly worse than RPA),
and also much better than the theoretical guarantee proved in Theorem 2. Finally note that although the
sequence of workers were adversarially chosen to begin with, a random permutation of this sequence makes
the problem significantly easier; to the point that even OHA which is designed to perform against worst case
sequences will also achieve a constant competitive ratio.
Uniform Heterogeneous Bids. We consider a similar distribution (with minor modification of parame-
ters) as the one introduced by Goel, Nikzad, and Singla [4]. They use this setting to analyze the performance
of their proposed algorithms for heterogeneous task assignment in the offline case. These inputs are aimed
to capture more realistic scenarios compared to our experiments in the previous part.
The distribution is as follows. We vary R in range from 2 to 50 and set B = 200. The workers are
heterogeneous and are only willing to solve a subset of all available tasks. In particular, we create n = 200
workers and m = 200 tasks and create a random graph with probability of edge formation equal to 0.05
between any of the (worker, task) pairs. Additionally, over each realized edge, we choose the bid of the
worker for the given task uniformly at random from {1, 2, . . . , R} (independently of the bids chosen over the
other edges for this worker). For each choice of R, we repeat the experiment 80 times and report the average
competitive ratio of the algorithms over the runs. Figure 2 illustrates the results of this experiment.
As seen in Figure 2 both algorithms perform very well over these inputs, obtaining a competitive ratio
that is nearly independent of R. Interestingly, OHA performs distinctly better than its theoretical guarantee,
even outperforming RPA. We suspect that this is because OHA is more adaptive than RPA, since it uses
a varying price threshold while RPA sticks to a fixed price (after discarding half the input). Hence RPA
exhausts the budget sooner than necessary, while additionally losing the contribution of half of the workers.
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A Proof of Lower Bound on Competitive Ratio
Theorem 3. For any (possibly randomized) online algorithm, there exists a set of sequences of worker
arrivals satisfying the large market assumption (all bids in [1, R] and R B) such that the competitive ratio
of the algorithm on the sequence is at least Ω (ln(R)).
Proof. We modify the proof of Theorem 2.2 by Zhou, Chakrabarty, and Lukose [13] to fit our problem
formulation.
We use Yao’s minimax principle; by constructing a distribution over a set of instances and showing
that no deterministic algorithm can achieve a expected competitive ratio which is better than ln(R) + 1 on
these instances, Yao’s principle implies that no randomized algorithm can beat this competitive ratio in the
worst-case [12].
To construct the distribution, fix η ∈ (0, 1), let k be the smallest integer such that (1− η)k ≤ 1/R, and
define k + 1 instances indexed by I0 to Ik as follows. I0 contains B/R identical workers all with bids equal
to R. For all u > 0, Iu is Iu−1 followed by B/(R(1 − η)u) workers all with bids equal to R(1 − η)u. Since
these instances have different length we pad all the instances with enough workers with bid R so that all the
instances have the same length.
We specify a distribution D by k + 1 values p0, . . . , pk where pu denotes the probability of occurrence of
instance Iu. Let
p0 = p1 = . . . = pk−1 :=
η
(k + 1)η + 1
and pk :=
1 + η
(k + 1)η + 1
.
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On this distribution of inputs, any deterministic algorithm is fully specified by the fraction of budget
spent on hiring workers with bid R(1− η)u; call each fraction fu. Since the optimal assignment for instance
i is to only hire workers with bids R(1− η)i, the inverse of the expected competitive ratio can be bounded
as follows.
k∑
u=0
pu
∑u
v=0 fvB/(R(1− η)v)
B/(R(1− η)u) =
k∑
u=0
pu
u∑
v=0
fv(1− η)u−v =
k∑
v=0
fv
k∑
u=v
pu(1− η)u−v, (6)
where the last statement is by expanding the sums and reordering the terms.
The second sum in the RHS of Equation (6) is bounded by
k∑
u=v
pu(1− η)u−v = 2η(1− η)
k−v + (1− η)
(k + 1)η + 1
≤ 2η + (1− η)
(k + 1)η + 1
=
1 + η
(k + 1)η + 1
, (7)
where the first equality is derived exactly similar to Zhou, Chakrabarty, and Lukose [13]. Replacing Equa-
tion (7) into the RHS of Equation (6),
k∑
v=0
fv
k∑
u=v
pu(1− η)u−v ≤ 1 + η
(k + 1)η + 1
k∑
v=0
fv ≤ 1 + η
(k + 1)η + 1
since by definition
∑k
v=0 fv ≤ 1.
Now by definition of k, we know (1− η)k ≤ 1/R, which implies k + 1 ≥ ln(R)/ ln(1/(1− η)). So,
k∑
v=0
fv
k∑
u=v
pu(1− η)u−v ≤ 1 + η
(k + 1)η + 1
≤ 1 + η
η ln(R)/ ln(1/(1− η)) + 1 = O
(
1
ln(R)
)
as η → 0, because limη→0 η/ ln(1/(1 − η)) = 1. Since we bound the inverse of the competitive ratio in the
above analysis, then the competitive ratio is at least Ω(lnR).
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